双语｜中国经济会重蹈日本覆辙吗？
双语｜中国经济会重蹈日本覆辙吗？
摘要
从国家信用评级，到公司债务水平、城市高房价，甚至是白领每日通勤时间，中国与二十年前的日本都有着惊人相似之处。 Is Chinas Economy Turning Japanese? I t is just over 30 years since Japan beg......从国家信用评级，到公司债务水平、城市高房价，甚至是白领每日通勤时间，中国与二十年前的日本都有着惊人相似之处。
Is China's Economy Turning Japanese?
It is just over 30 years since Japan beganinflatinga property and stock market bubble whose implosion ravaged public confidence, cowed corporations andscarred an economy for decades.
自日本的房地产和股市泡沫开始膨胀算起，至今已满30年，那场泡沫的破灭重创公众信心，让企业胆战心惊，给日本经济留下了数十年的创伤。
How great is the risk of China turning Japanese? Does China,the world's second-biggest economy in 2017, run the risk of repeating the fate of what was the world's second-biggest economyin 1989― Japanese-style “lost decades?”. If Japan's fate were to befall its giant neighbour, the consequences would be devastating for the global economy. China provides 40 per cent of its annual growth. China also buys just over 20 per cent of US exports, the same percentage as Japan in the mid-1980s.
中国变得像日本一样的风险有多大呢？2017年的世界第二大经济体中国，是否可能重演1989年的世界第二大经济体的命运――经历日本式“失去的十年”？如果日本的命运降临在其庞大的邻国身上，将对全球经济造成灾难性的影响。中国贡献了全球经济年度增长的40%。此外，中国占美国出口总额的比例略高于20%，与上世纪80年代中期的日本一样。
Ashort answer ―China has already hit various milestones that recall Japan in its late 1980s pomp. Some, such ascorporate debt levelsto average white-collarcommuting timesin China, and the non-financial corporatedebt-to-GDP ratioreaching similar levels of about 155 per cent, are technical.
简单来说，中国已经有了多个令人忆起上世纪80年代末如日中天日本的特征，比如从公司债务水平到白领平均通勤时间；比如非金融公司债务与GDP的比率达到了约155%的相似水平。
Japan 1980s v.s. China now
上世纪80年代的日本vs当今的中国
1. Most prominent overseas corporate purchase
最著名的海外公司收购
JapanSony paid $3.4bn for Columbia Pictures in 1989
日本索尼1989年斥资34亿美元收购哥伦比亚电影公司
ChinaChemChina’s pending purchase of Syngenta for $43bn
中国化工拟以430亿美元收购先正达
The clean-up of Japan‘’s post-bubble financial crisis ― painfully delayed until themid-2000s because of a stubborn reluctance to trigger corporate failures and mass lay-offs ― represents a masterclass for China inwhat not to do should it face a similar crisis in its banking system.
日本对泡沫破裂后的金融危机的清理――由于固执地不愿触发企业破产和大规模裁员，清理工作痛苦地延迟至2005年前后――给中国上了一课，让后者明白如果本国银行业体系面临类似危机时不要做什么。
At a psychological level, the Japanese experience of watching the stock market triple in value between 1985 and 1989 corresponds with its modern Chinese counterpart:the ascent of assetshas knotted itself around a deepeningsense of national ascendancy.
在心理层面，日本股市在1985年至1989年期间市值增长3倍的情形与现代的中国股市如出一辙：资产升值与日益加深的民族崛起感交织在一起。
Yet there are some very specific points where thecomparisons fail.Economic historians date the start of Japan's bubble economy to September 1985 and the Plaza Accord agreement in New York that gave a green light to the depreciation of the dollar, paving the way for the market to take control. The yen strengthened from ￥240 against the dollar to ￥120 three years later. China, in contrast,carefully manages its currencyand regularly cracks down on speculative behaviour. As it demonstrated in July 2015 when it controversially stepped in to arrest declines on the stock market, theChinese state has a formidable arsenal of weaponry.That is unlikely to change.
然而也有一些非常明确的对比失效的情况。经济历史学家认为日本泡沫经济肇始于1985年9月在纽约签署的《广场协议》(Plaza Accord)，该协议为美元贬值开了绿灯，从而为市场占据主导地位铺好了道路。3年后，日元兑美元汇率从1美元兑240日元升值至1美元兑120日元。相比之下，中国谨慎管理人民币汇率，而且时不时打击投机行为。正如2015年7月引发争议的入场干预以阻止股市下跌时展示的那样，中国政府拥有令人生畏的“弹药库”。这种状况不太可能发生变化。
2. Land buying overseas
海外买地
JapanMitsubishi Estate bought Rockefeller Center in October 1989 for $900m
1989年10月，日本三地所(Mitsubishi Estate)以9亿美元收购了洛克菲勒中心。
ChinaAnbang’s purchase of New York’s Waldorf Astoria for almost $2bn in 2014
2014年，中国安邦以近20亿美元收购了纽约的华尔道夫酒店。
Another striking difference between China's present and Japan's past is the unique nature of the Chinese party-state. Two-thirds of corporate debt is owed by state-owned enterprises to state-owned banks. China’s debt is overwhelmingly owed by one government entity to another. Normal credit analysis fails in this context, given the government's capability inreshuffling debt within the system.
中国现状与日本过去的第二个不同在于，中国一党制政府的独特性质。三分之二的企业债务是国有企业欠国有银行的。中国债务基本上都是一个政府实体欠另一个政府实体的。在这种情况下，正常的信贷分析会失效，因为中国政府能够在体系内重组债务。
But its expansion has also been much faster. In Japan it took a quarter of a century for private sector debt to almost double from 125 per cent of economic output in 1970 to more than 220 per cent in 1995. China's private sector debt burden soared from 115 per cent of GDP to more than 210 per cent in just the past nine years.
但中国债务的增长也要快得多。在日本，私人部门债务与经济产值的比例从1970年的125%上升近一倍至1995年的220%，用了25年时间。中国私人部门债务与GDP的比例在过去9年里就从115%飙升至210%。
“China cannot escape all the laws of economics but it is unique in many respects,” says Eswar Prasad, a China finance expert at Cornell University.
康奈尔大学(Cornell University)的中国金融专家埃斯瓦尔?普拉萨德(Eswar Prasad)表示：“中国不可能躲过所有的经济法则，但它在许多方面确实独特。”
3. Eye-catching overseas art purchase
引人瞩目的海外艺术品购买
Japan“Portrait of Dr Gachet” by Vincent van Gogh bought by Daishowa Paper’s Ryoei Saito for $82.5m in May 1990.
1990年5月，日本大昭和制纸的齐藤良平以8250万美元的价格购买了梵高(Vincent van Gogh)创作的《加歇医生》。
ChinaLiu Yiqian’s 2015 purchase of Amedeo Modigliani’s painting “Nu Couché” for $170m.
中国的刘益谦在2015年以1.7亿美元的价格购买了阿梅代奥?莫迪利亚尼的作品《侧卧的裸女》。
If the mark of a real bubble is that it spills into unusual assets, in China, look no further than thespring crop price of Old Banzhang― generally regarded as the finest of Pu’er teas. It has soared almost 90 per cent over the past year to Rmb15,000 ($2,174) a kilo, making it four times more expensive, by weight, than silver.
如果出现真正的泡沫的标志是泡沫向不寻常的资产类别溢出，在中国只需要看看一般被认为是顶级普洱茶的老班章春茶的价格。这种茶叶的价格在过去一年中上涨了近90%，至每公斤1.5万元人民币，是以重量计白银价格的4倍。
In Japan, a similar cocktail of ostentation and speculative money propelled the membership fee of Japan’s Koganei Country Club golf course to $3.5m.
同样的事情在日本，1987年，炫耀和投机性货币的类似组合助推日本小金井乡村俱乐部高尔夫球场会员费达到350万美元。
4. Number of outbound tourists (as % of population)
出境游客数量
Japan7.85 per cent, 9.66m tourists in 1989
1989年，日本出境游客为966万人，占总人口比例7.85%。
China8.56 per cent, 122m tourists in 2016
2016年，中国出境游客人数为1.22亿，占总人口比例为8.56%。
Abubble is a euphoric ending to a long period of prosperity. It starts with sensible optimism and morphs into a sense that there are no limits?.?.?.?every class of investor wants to participate. People become euphoric about their country. And Japan was a total bubble ― with stocks and real estate inflating at the same time.The euphoria was social and political as well as economic and financial.
泡沫是一段漫长繁荣期的欣快症式终结。开始人们抱着一种合理的乐观情绪，接着就演变成一种没有上限的感觉……各类投资者都希望参与进来。人们变得为国家欢欣鼓舞。日本就是一整个泡沫――股市和房地产同时膨胀。这种欣快症不仅体现在经济和金融方面，还体现在社会和政治方面。
In both China and Japan thesense of confidencecomes from having overcome a threat that initially appeared devastating ― in Japan’s case the “oil shock” of rising prices in the early 1980s, andin China’s the fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis.
中国和日本的自信都来自克服了最初看起来令人灰心的威胁，日本克服的是上世纪80年代初油价不断攀升的“石油危机”，中国克服的则是2008年全球金融危机的影响。
But there are differences too. In Japan, the Plaza Accord [and a strong yen] allowed the Bank of Japan to maintain an easy policy for a long time. The banks were under pressure and they took significant risk.In China,the confidence comes from thinking ‘we have attracted huge money flows from outside the country and this will continue forever.
不过，两者之间也存在不同。在日本，《广场协议》令日本央行得以长期维持宽松政策。银行面临着压力，它们承担了巨大风险。在中国，自信则来自那种‘我们从国外吸引了规模巨大的资金流，这种局面将永远持续下去’的想法。
5. Economy ― What the experts say
经济――专家的说法
It is also worried about disturbing demographic trends that, as in Japan, could depress Chinese savings and growth. Both countries have passed from a phase of demographic bonus to demographic burden as the working-age populationaged 15 to 54 has begun to decline. For Japan, that crossover was in 1990. In China, it happened in 2012, markingthe end of its“demographic dividend”.
中国政府对人口发展势头也十分担心。和日本类似，中国的人口发展势头可能抑制中国的存款和增长。随着15岁至54岁之间的劳动年龄人口开始下滑，两国都从人口红利阶段进入了人口负担阶段。对日本来说，这一转变发生在1990年。在中国，转变发生在2012年，标志着中国“人口红利”的终结。
To the extent that some see compelling similarities between the inflation of the Japanese bubble and China’s present situation, the focus has shifted to whether China is close to the same turning points faced by Japan at the start of the 1990s.Moody’slast week downgraded China’s sovereign rating toA1,the same level as Japan,citing a large and growing debt burden. But the rating agency also upgraded its outlook for the Chinese economy and predicted thatits growth potential would slow to 5 per cent by 2022, a far better outcome than the sudden crash and years of stagnation experienced by Japan.
由于部分人认识到了日本泡沫膨胀和中国当前局面之间的高度相似性，人们的焦点已转向中国是否正接近和日本在上世纪90年代初一样的拐点。近日，穆迪将中国的主权信用评级降到了和日本同样的A1级别，并提到这么做的原因是中国规模庞大而又不断增长的债务负担。不过，该评级机构同时上调了对中国经济的展望，并预计其增长潜力到2022年或放缓至5%，这样的结果将远远好于日本所经历的突然崩溃和多年经济停滞。
6.Per capita GDP
人均GDP
Japan$23,472 in 1989
日本1989年，23472美元
China$8,069, 2015
中国2015年，8069美元
In both countries, bubble-like behaviour has produced profound changes in the lives of millions of people. As the Japanese property and stock bubble neared its peak, theprice of livingin the cities skeetered out of the reach of ordinary “salarymen”. By 1989, a modest, 75 sq metre apartment a 90-minute commute from central Tokyo cost 8.5 times the average white-collar salary. Three decades later China is witnessing an even more dramatic dynamic at play in its capital. The average cost of a 100 sq metre apartment in Beijing is Rmb5m ― ormore than 50 times the average annual income of local residents.
在中日两国，泡沫行为深刻改变了无数人的生活。在日本地产和股市泡沫接近顶峰时，日本城市居住成本超出了普通“工薪族”的承受能力。到1989年，一套距东京市中心90分钟通勤路程的75平米中档公寓的价格，需花费白领平均薪资的8.5倍。30年后，中国正在其首都见证更具戏剧性的一幕。北京一套100平米公寓的平均价格是500万元人民币，是当地居民平均年收入的50倍以上。
At some level, China appears to have taken the Mieno experience to heart, and cautiously speaks in terms of “containing” increasesrather than deflating a bubblethat has transformed tens of millions of urban residents into dollar millionaires. But it is a finely balanced thing. Beijing’s awareness of that fragility is clear, as Mr Xi recently warned that “houses are for living in, not speculating on”.
在某种程度上，中国似乎谨记三重野康的经历，措辞十分谨慎，使用“遏制”增长这样的字眼，而不说压缩泡沫――中国这轮泡沫已将数以千万计的市民变为数百万美元身家的富豪。不过，这方面中国在仔细权衡。中国政府对其脆弱性是有清晰认识的，正如习近平最近曾警告的，“房子是用来住的、不是用来炒的”。